“ALL IS FAIR IN POLITICS”: HOW WRONG WAS PRESIDENT TINUBU? ~ JOE EDET

On Tuesday, 28 July 2026, while receiving members of the Catholic Bishops’ Conference of Nigeria at the Presidential Villa, Abuja, President Bola Ahmed Tinubu made a remarkable declaration concerning the emerging contest for political power ahead of Nigeria’s 2027 general elections. 

Responding to the prospect of political opponents attempting to unseat him, the President stated: “Those who would take it from me will try. They will try. All is fair in politics, and there is equal opportunity.” 

He continued: “I won’t offer them a red carpet. I won’t offer them the leash to tie me at home. No, we will wrestle each other to the finishing point. That’s the truth. That is fair in politics.” 

Properly contextualised, the President’s statement is capable of a relatively benign interpretation. It may be understood simply as an affirmation that democratic politics is inherently competitive; that incumbency does not impose an obligation upon a sitting President to facilitate the victory of his opponents; that opposition parties remain entitled to challenge the incumbent; and that the incumbent is equally entitled to deploy every lawful democratic strategy to retain electoral support. 

On that narrow interpretation, the statement is hardly controversial. No democratic principle requires an incumbent to provide his political opponents with the proverbial “red carpet” to power. 

The difficulty, however, lies in the breadth of the expression “all is fair in politics.” 

Taken literally, the proposition suggests that political competition possesses no external legal or moral boundaries and that whatever advances the acquisition or retention of political power may be regarded as permissible. 

Such an interpretation would be fundamentally inconsistent with constitutional democracy and against the framework of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended), the Electoral Act 2026, the constitutional powers and responsibilities of INEC, the rule of law, electoral jurisprudence and the broader requirements of democratic constitutionalism.

The central argument is that while politics necessarily involves competition, strategy, negotiation, coalition-building, persuasion, defections, compromise and the legitimate exploitation of an opponent’s political weaknesses, all cannot be fair in politics. 

Nigerian constitutional and electoral law expressly places boundaries around the struggle for political power. 

Bribery, vote-buying, intimidation, undue influence, violence, impersonation, electoral manipulation, abuse of public institutions and other prohibited practices do not become “fair” merely because they are politically advantageous. 

Indeed, the very existence of the Constitution, the Electoral Act, INEC, election tribunals and electoral offences demonstrates that Nigerian democracy rejects an unlimited conception of political competition. 

Sections 1(1) and (3), 14(1), 14(2)(a) and (c), 40, 153, and 221–229 of the Constitution of the Federal republic of Nigeria, 1999, together with the relevant provisions of the Electoral Act 2026, subject political competition to constitutional and statutory restraints. 

The jurisprudence of Nigerian superior courts, including Amaechi v INEC (2008) 5 NWLR (Pt 1080) 227; Buhari v INEC (2008) 19 NWLR (Pt 1120) 246; and Dingyadi v INEC (2011) 10 NWLR (Pt 1255) 347, equally demonstrates that neither political expediency nor electoral victory places political conduct beyond the reach of law.

Consequently, one has to distinguish between political hardball and political illegality. 

A politician may lawfully outmanoeuvre an opponent, build superior coalitions, persuade opposition members to defect, campaign vigorously, expose an opponent’s political weaknesses and deploy every legitimate electoral advantage available to him. What he cannot legitimately do is convert electoral competition into a justification for illegality, abuse of state institutions or the subversion of the sovereign will of the electorate. 

Accordingly, it is contended that President Tinubu was correct only to the limited extent that democratic politics permits vigorous and uncompromising lawful competition. 

He was wrong, however, if the proposition that “all is fair in politics” is intended or understood literally. 

The constitutionally defensible proposition is therefore not that “all is fair in politics,” but that: “All lawful, constitutional and democratically legitimate strategies are fair in politics.” 

That qualification represents the boundary between political strategy and political lawlessness, between electoral competition and democratic subversion, and ultimately between the pursuit of power and constitutional statesmanship.

Indeed, the immediate metaphor is that of political combat within a democratic contest, not the abandonment of electoral rules.

That distinction is important. Scholarly criticism must begin by presenting fairly the strongest interpretation of the proposition being criticised. 

The issue, therefore, is not whether President Tinubu is entitled to fight politically for his re-election. Of course he is. Neither the Constitution nor democratic morality requires an incumbent President to surrender political ground to his opponents. 

He may campaign vigorously, mobilise his party, build coalitions, persuade voters, attract defectors, expose the weaknesses of his opponents and deploy every advantage legitimately available within the constitutional order. 

The deeper question raised by his statement is different: Can “all” ever be fair in democratic politics It is here that the President’s formulation becomes problematic. 

The word “all” is absolute. Constitutional democracy is not. Constitutionalism proceeds from precisely the opposite assumption—that political power, including the struggle to acquire or retain it, must be restrained by law. 

The Constitution establishes boundaries.The Electoral Act establishes boundaries.Criminal law establishes boundaries. Political morality establishes boundaries. The judiciary polices boundaries. INEC exists to administer elections according to prescribed boundaries. Election tribunals exist because political victory obtained contrary to prescribed legal requirements may be challenged. Electoral offences exist because Parliament has determined that certain methods of seeking political advantage are simply impermissible. 

Consequently, the existence of Nigerian electoral law constitutes, in itself, a powerful rebuttal of the literal proposition that “all is fair in politics.” 

The proper inquiry is therefore not whether politics is competitive. That is self-evident. The inquiry is: Where does legitimate political strategy end and political illegality begin? 

That question provides the foundation for examining the plausibility or otherwise of President Tinubu’s proposition. And it leads inevitably to the Constitution.

JOE EDET, a legal scholar and Constitutional Lawyer is the Vice Chancellor, Arthur Jarvis University.